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1. Introduction
We analyse earnings quality for a lar ge sample of
UK failed firms in the four years before failure
(from year t-4 to year t, where t is the year of firm
failure). While there is extensive research
analysing the quality of accounting numbers in 
financially troubled firms, empirical evidence on
the earnings behaviour of ex-post bankrupt (failed)
firms in the years leading up to bankruptcy is
scarce. Prior research has focused exclusively on
accounting manipulation either in the year imme-
diately prior to failure (Smith et al., 2001) or 
aggregating information from the years before
failure (Rosner, 2003). These studies do not con-
sider how manipulation evolves as failure ap-
proaches, and report only descriptive evidence of
real activities manipulation. In addition, they fail
to provide evidence on the consequences that 
managerial manipulation has over the reliability or
usefulness of earnings.1
We ar gue that in the presence of deteriorating
firm performance: (1) managers of ex-post failed
firms manipulate both accruals and real activities
to conceal poor performance in the years preced-
ing failure; however, (2) as failure approaches, and
when the opportunities for further accrual manipu-
lation are exhausted, it is anticipated that prior 
manipulation will reverse into lar ge negative 
accruals. Hence, prior studies in this area that 
aggregate data from the final years prior to 
bankruptcy or analyse only the year before failure,
potentially provide confounding evidence on 
earnings quality patterns in ex-post failed firms.
Generally, we expect that managers prefer the 
manipulation of accruals over the manipulation 
of real activities, as the latter is more costly .
Consequently, (3) managers are likely to resort to
the manipulation of real activities only when there
is limited scope left for accrual manipulation.
Finally, we argue that (4) the manipulation of both
accruals and real activities has severe consequences
on the reliability of earnings for decision-making.
We expect that managerial manipulation reduces
the reliability of accounting numbers, leading to
reduced conditional conservatism. Therefore, we
explore and provide new evidence on three 
important aspects that have not been analysed in
detail by prior work, namely managerial use of 
accounting and real activities manipulation to hide
poor performance, how manipulation evolves as
failure looms closer and the opportunities for 
successfully postponing bankruptcy diminish, 
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‘insolvency’ and ‘bankruptcy’ interchangeably throughout the
paper.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
 C
ar
lo
s 
Ii
i M
ad
ri
d]
 a
t 1
1:
46
 2
5 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
1 
1
and the consequences of this manipulation on the 
reliability of earnings.
Furthering our understanding of these three is-
sues is crucial for: (1) the adequate development of
new accounting standards and corporate gover-
nance regulations aimed at tackling opportunistic
managerial behaviour in financially troubled
firms; as well as (2) the improvement of bankrupt-
cy prediction models, by explicitly taking into 
account managerial attempts to hide poor perform-
ance. It is commonly accepted that investors can
predict bankruptcy fairly accurately using predic-
tion models. However, these models are based to a
great extent on accounting data that can be manip-
ulated by management (Ohlson, 1980). We show
that managers make both accounting and operating
decisions that af fect the reliability of accounting
numbers, and how these decisions accumulate and
reverse in the year prior to bankruptcy . This evi-
dence is potentially important in designing bank-
ruptcy prediction models that may be able to
account for the observations reported in this paper.
Finally, we provide limited evidence (3) that man-
agers manipulate real decisions to postpone bank-
ruptcy. This evidence raises awareness of
sub-optimal decision making that may be particu-
larly relevant for debt holders and claimants. Sub-
optimal operating, financing or investment
decision-making may deplete the firm of some of
its assets or, at the very least, reduce their liquida-
tion value. The evidence on real actions is of inter-
est to those directly involved in the liquidation
process of the company, in terms of timing the de-
cision on when to initiate a winding-up petition, or
to best estimate the liquidation value of the firm
prior to bankruptcy.
Using a lar ge sample of continuing and failed
UK firms from 1995 to 2004, we find that ex-post
failed firms engage in both accounting manipula-
tion and real activities manipulation in the four
years prior to failure. This is consistent with the
evidence in Beaver (1966) that the properties of
accounting numbers between failing and continu-
ing firms differ in the five years prior to the failure
event. As bankruptcy approaches, the manipula-
tion unravels and we observe large negative accru-
als in the year just before failure. We analyse the
existence of accounting and real activities manip-
ulation using discretionary accruals models (Jones,
1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Kasznik, 1999) and the
abnormal cash flow model proposed by Dechow et
al. (1998) as implemented by Roychowdhury
(2006). Our results provide evidence consistent
with the existence of managerial preferences and
trade-offs in selecting earnings management in-
struments as suggested – but untested – by prior
research (e.g. Peasnell et al., 2000). We show that
firms with a higher probability of bankruptcy, like-
ly having exhausted their opportunities for suc-
cessful accounting manipulation, engage in the
manipulation of real activities. Our sample of
failed firms provides a good setting for a test of
real earnings management, because even if real
manipulation implies higher costs, bankruptcy is
certainly more costly. Finally, our results are con-
sistent with managers successfully concealing
poor performance through accounting manipula-
tion, as we find that accruals manipulation is more
pronounced in ex-post failed firms with low ex-
ante failure probability.
In what we think is a significant contribution of
the paper, we formally assess the impact of these
two types of manipulation on the reliability or use-
fulness of earnings. To do so, we analyse if ex-post
failed firms report significantly less conditionally
conservative earnings than continuing firms.
Following Basu (1997), we identify conditional
conservatism with an asymmetric recognition of
economic gains and losses into earnings, and we
measure it using the methodology proposed by
Ball and Shivakumar (2005). 2 Prior research
shows that conditional conservatism is a desirable
property of earnings as it is a key corporate gover-
nance provision that provides important economic
benefits such as reducing agency problems driven
by information asymmetries (Beekes et al., 2004;
Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; García Lara et al.,
2007, 2009; LaFond and Watts, 2008), and that it
varies substantially across firms in a predictable
way (e.g. Ball et al., 2000; Qiang, 2007), especial-
ly when there are dif ferences in accrual-based
earnings management (García Lara et al., 2005).
Our results show that ex-post bankrupt firms re-
port less conditionally conservative earnings in the
years prior to failure than continuing firms. This
reduced conditional conservatism, as suggested by
prior research, increases agency problems and the
probability of stakeholder expropriation.
The paper makes several contributions to the ex-
isting literature. Specifically, we add to the stream
of research on the quality of earnings in failed
firms in several ways. First, we analyse two differ-
ent aspects of earnings management: accounting
manipulation and real activity manipulation,
showing that managers resort to both. We also pro-
vide evidence on the timing of the manipulation,
120 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
2 We use the term conditional conservatism following Beaver
and R yan (2005). Other studies use ‘earnings conservatism’,
‘income-statement conservatism’, ‘ex-post conservatism’ or
‘news-driven’ conservatism to refer to the same phenomenon.
3 Prior research assumes the manipulation is the same from
five years prior to bankruptcy to the year just before bank-
ruptcy (Rosner, 2003), or analyses only the manipulation in
the year just before failure (Smith et al., 2001). By aggregat-
ing data over the years prior to failure, an analysis would sim-
ilarly classify a firm that steadily increases earnings quality
from low to high with a firm that does the reverse; as on aver-
age across the five years they would both look similar when
they are indeed very different.
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as we show it starts four years prior to failure, and
that accrual manipulation unravels in the year just
before failure. 3 Second, we show ex-post failed
firms with a low ex-ante failure probability engage
in more pronounced accruals manipulation. We in-
terpret this evidence as firms being successful in
hiding poor performance through accruals manip-
ulation. On the other hand, firms with a high ex-
ante failure probability , having likely exhausted
their opportunities for accrual manipulation, ma-
nipulate real activities more aggressively . Third,
we conduct conditional conservatism tests to
analyse whether the manipulation (both account-
ing and real activities manipulation) leads to more
aggressive accounting. We find that ex-post failed
firms report less conditionally conservative earn-
ings and, as suggested by prior research in condi-
tional conservatism, this implies increased agency
problems. Finally , prior research has focused on
the US (Rosner , 2003), or in periods of recession
(Smith et al., 2001). We use a UK sample over the
period 1995–2004. The UK insolvency code al-
lows for a wider definition of bankruptcy, with dif-
ferent implications, than in the US (Franks et al.,
1996; Bradbury, 2007).
The remainder of the paper is structured as fol-
lows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature in
this area and presents the research questions.
Section 3 details the sample selection procedure
and describes the methodology. Section 4 discuss-
es the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Background and research questions
2.1. Firm failure in the UK
The UK Insolvency Act 1986 and its subsequent
amendments govern the legal failure routes, rules
and regulations for insolvent British companies.
The Act provides several legal courses of action
for companies in financial distress, the most com-
mon and popular ones being administration, ad-
ministrative receivership and liquidation.
An administration order is a court order placing
a company that is, or is likely to become, insolvent
under the control of an administrator following a
petition by the company, its directors or a creditor
(Part II, Insolvency Act 1986, s. 8–27). The purpose
of the order is to preserve the company’ s business
and assets to allow a reor ganisation, or ensure the
most advantageous realisation of its assets whilst
protecting it from action by its creditors.
An administrative receivership arises as a result
of a company defaulting on secured borrowing
(Part III, Insolvency Act 1986, s. 28–72). The bor-
rowing is usually from a bank. Under receivership,
a receiver is appointed by the creditor to run the
company with the objective of recovering the out-
standing bank finance, through any means
(Chapter I, Part III). From a company point of
view, the company is rarely saved in its existing
form, its assets are often subject to a meltdown and
often jobs and economic activity is lost.
Finally, the liquidation or winding up of compa-
nies is the procedure whereby the assets of a 
company are gathered in and realised, the liabili-
ties are met, and surplus, if any exists, is distrib-
uted to members (Part IV , Insolvency Act 1986, 
s. 73–219). Liquidation can be either compulsory
or voluntary. In compulsory liquidation, a wind-
ing-up petition is initiated, usually by a creditor ,
due to an outstanding debt that the company has
not paid (Chapter VI, Part IV , Insolvency Act
1986). Voluntary liquidation is the placing of the
company into liquidation by resolution of its mem-
bers. There are two types of voluntary liquidation:
creditors’ voluntary liquidation and members’ vol-
untary liquidation. In the former case, the directors
of the company, who assess that the company is, or
will be, insolvent, approach an insolvency practi-
tioner to wind up the company . In such cases, the
creditors have the right to reject (by value of vote)
the choice of the liquidator chosen by the compa-
ny directors (Chapter IV , Part IV , Insolvency Act
1986). On the other hand, a members’ voluntary
liquidation does not involve insolvency and comes
about merely because the company shareholders
wish to have the value of their holding realised
(Chapter III, Part IV, Insolvency Act 1986).
2.2. Prior evidence on earnings management in
financially distressed firms
Prior research on earnings management by trou-
bled companies commonly focuses on firms that
are showing signs of financial distress. A popular
proxy for distress is debt covenant violation.
Positive accounting theory predicts that firms ap-
proaching covenant violations will make income-
increasing accounting choices to loosen their debt
constraints (W atts and Zimmerman, 1986).
Sweeney (1994) and DeFond and Jiambalvo
(1994) find evidence consistent with this hypothe-
sis. Nonetheless, results are not always consistent;
in fact, several studies find firms in distress re-
porting large negative accruals (DeAngelo et al.,
1994; Peltier -Rivest, 1999; Saleh and Ahmed,
2005), and argue that managers prefer to reflect the
firm’s financial troubles to signal their willingness
to deal with them (DeAngelo et al., 1994), or to
obtain concessions from labour unions and subsi-
dies from government. In all likelihood, a number
of these financially troubled firms will approach or
enter into technical default. However, covenant vi-
olations are not always associated with increased
distress risk. To account for this, several studies
employ alternative definitions of distress such as
dividend declines and series of consecutive losses
(DeAngelo et al., 1994; Peltier -Rivest, 1999), or
receiving going-concern audit opinions (Butler et
al., 2004). These studies find that distressed firms
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 121
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have large negative, performance-related accruals,
but do not attribute this finding to earnings man-
agement practices. Instead, they ar gue that firms
with high risk of failure engage in liquidity en-
hancing transactions in an attempt to survive.
The proxies used by prior research are likely to
overstate the actual cases of severely troubled
firms. Clearly, a more objective definition of fi-
nancial distress is legal (involuntary) failure. Few
studies, however , make use of bankruptcy data,
probably due to the inherent dif ficulty in finding
adequate data for firms that do not exist anymore.
Also, bankruptcy presents a rather narrow defini-
tion of failure, with only a very small percentage
of listed firms going bankrupt. However, the stake-
holders of a failed company suf fer more severe
losses than those of firms exhibiting weak per-
formance. Hence, the detection of aggressive ac-
counting practices in the years that precede
bankruptcy becomes critical.
Only the prior work of Smith et al. (2001),
Rosner (2003) and Charitou et al. (2007a, 2007b)
directly examines the properties of earnings in ac-
tually failed firms. For an Australian sample,
Smith et al. find that ex-post bankrupt firms do not
engage in accounting changes to inflate earnings in
the year just before failure (year t-1). They find
that distressed firms that do not end up being bank-
rupt change their accounting policies to increase
earnings. However, they do not directly examine
whether ex-post bankrupt firms changed their ac-
counting policies in the years before t-1, while
managers still believe in the recovery of the firm. 4
Also, they do not separately analyse accrual 
accounting behaviour in bankrupt firms with a 
low ex-ante probability of bankruptcy . Because
their benchmark for failure is set on a specific date
(12 months after filing the 1988 accounts), they
cannot follow up on the behaviour of their 
distressed company sample. In contrast, our 
procedure allows us to follow up on firms that
show little outward signs of distress but end up
bankrupt. Since we do not know if the distressed
firms in the Smith et al. study ended up bankrupt,
their results on accounting changes in a period of
economic downturn are dif ficult to interpret.
Additionally, these changes in policies have to be
reported in the financial statements, and thus, as
earnings management instruments, they lack the
element of concealment.
More closely related to our study, Rosner (2003)
investigates accrual manipulation on a sample of
293 failed US companies and finds that firms ma-
nipulate earnings upwards in pre-bankruptcy non-
going-concern years. However , in her tests she
pools all years together and assumes that the ma-
nipulation of earnings in ex-post bankrupt firms is
the same during the five years prior to failure. Our
results indicate that this is not the case. In addition,
she shows that in the year preceding failure, firms
receiving going-concern opinions exhibit income-
decreasing behaviour. She attributes this to the over-
statement reversals that auditors demand when
they eventually detect a going-concern problem.
Finally, the work of Charitou et al. (2007a,
2007b), which closely relates to that of Rosner
(2003), uses a sample of US firms that filed for
Chapter 11 to analyse earnings management prac-
tices in distressed firms. However, their focus is on
analysing the role played by auditors and other
monitoring bodies in constraining earnings manip-
ulation in the year just before bankruptcy and on
the links between earnings manipulation in the
year prior to filing for bankruptcy and the likeli-
hood of survival thereafter.
2.3. Research questions
2.3.1. Accounting manipulation
Firms approaching bankruptcy probably engage
in income-increasing earnings management prac-
tices (decreasing cost of goods sold, releasing bad
debt accruals, etc.) in an attempt to ride out what is
probably deemed by management as a temporary
bad period. Managerial optimism most likely pre-
vails, leading managers to maintain the belief that
firm performance will improve in the following
periods and thus, to keep manipulating earnings
upwards even when they know that their actions
will accumulate and reverse in the future (Graham
et al., 2005). However, there are limits to manage-
rial optimistic biases. The balance sheet accumu-
lates previous decisions, placing constraints to the
number of consecutive years when over -optimism
can be exerted without committing GAAP viola-
tions (Barton and Simko, 2002). Precisely because
firms end up failed, there is an assurance that de-
teriorating financial health was not a temporary
concern. It is expected that: (1) the scope for ac-
crual management will decrease as bankruptcy ap-
proaches, as managers exhaust their opportunities
for successful manipulation; and also that (2) the
actions undertaken in the years leading up to bank-
ruptcy will accumulate in the final year, cascading
into large negative accruals when previous manip-
ulation reverses and deteriorating performance
cannot be hidden any longer. Thus, we test the fol-
lowing hypotheses (in alternative form):
H1A: Failed firms manage earnings in the years
before failure;
H1B: In the year prior to bankruptcy , as 
managers exhaust their opportunities for
122 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
4 Their sample covers only 1988. As they recognise, their
evidence might not be generalisable due to the stock 
market crash of 1987 and the subsequent financial crisis 
(likely leading to increased monitoring). We cover a longer
and more stable time period (1998–2004), in a stable 
macroeconomic environment (the UK).
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successful accrual manipulation, previously
manipulated accruals reverse, leading to 
an accumulation of negative accruals just
before failure.
2.3.2. Real earnings management
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we define
real earnings manipulation as ‘management ac-
tions that deviate from normal business practices,
undertaken with the primary objective of meeting
certain earnings thresholds’ (p. 336). Earnings in-
centives give rise to sub-optimal operating, in-
vestment and financing decision making, when
managers resort to real actions to meet their in-
come tar gets. The seminal work of Schipper
(1989: 92) puts forward as an example of real
earnings management the timing of investment or
financing decisions to alter reported earnings.
Subsequent research demonstrates that managers
time the sale of long-lived assets and investments
(Bartov, 1993), delay and abandon research and
development projects, give more lenient credit
terms or reduce necessary expenses such as those
on advertising and asset maintenance to meet
their earnings tar gets (Bushee, 1998; Graham 
et al., 2005, Roychowdhury , 2006; Cohen et al.,
2008; García Osma and Young, 2009). 5 Thus,
whilst real earnings management is not an entire-
ly accounting phenomenon (in that it is not di-
rectly achieved through accounting), it is driven
by the desire to keep up accounting appearances.
A survey by Graham et al. (2005) of 401 financial
executives indicates a preference for real actions
over purely accounting decisions to manipulate
earnings. Similar UK survey studies present com-
parable views (Demirag, 1995; Grinyer et al.,
1998).
In the case of failing firms, real earnings ma-
nipulation is aimed at increasing current earnings
to conceal poor performance. However, real earn-
ings manipulation is expected to reduce future
cash flows, and, consequently , firm value. As
pointed out by Peasnell et al. (2000: 420–421) the
use of sub-optimal operating strategies is more
costly than the reversals from accruals, and, con-
sequently a more aggressive form of earnings
management and thus, a last resource for man-
agement. However, even if real earnings manipu-
lation is costly, bankruptcy is certainly even more
so. In failed firms, the years prior to bankruptcy
are probably characterised by more aggressive
accounting practices, and in all likelihood, also
by the undertaking of real actions to manage
earnings and perceptions, particularly in those
firms that have exhausted their possibilities for
successful accrual manipulation. Therefore, we
extend our analysis to study abnormal cash flow
activity.
H2: Failed firms engage in real earnings 
manipulation in the years before failure.
Real earnings management will be more
pronounced if the firm’ s financial condi-
tion is weak and the possibilities for accru-
al manipulation have been exhausted.
2.3.3. Effects of accounting and real earnings
manipulation on the usefulness of earnings
Prior research on earnings management in
healthy firms shows that often discretionary 
accruals are value-relevant and are used by man-
agers as a signalling device (Guay et al., 1996;
Subramanyam, 1996). Healy and Palepu (1993)
argue that income-increasing strategies have sig-
nalling value if they are used to communicate in-
creases in future earnings to investors. In those
cases, discretionary accruals can increase the use-
fulness of accounting numbers. However , as our
sample comprises only ex-post bankrupt firms, we
expect that income-increasing discretionary accru-
als in the years preceding failure will be due to op-
portunistic managerial behaviour.
Early work on failed firms only studies the mag-
nitude of the proxies for income-increasing strate-
gies to ascertain whether they respond to
signalling vs. opportunistic reporting. We go one
step beyond the descriptive evidence on the quan-
tity of policy changes and discretionary accruals in
Smith et al. (2001) and Rosner (2003) and explic-
itly analyse the consequences of managerial ma-
nipulation by studying if the reliability of
accounting numbers in failed firms is hindered by
their income increasing strategies. To do so, we
study the conditional conservatism of earnings in
failed vs. continuing firms.
We choose conditional conservatism as a
benchmark to assess whether the usefulness of
earnings declines in ex-post bankrupt firms as a
result of both accounting and real activities ma-
nipulation for several reasons: (1) conditional
conservatism is a summary measure of manageri-
al reporting choices; (2) extant evidence demon-
strates that better governed firms report more
conditionally conservative earnings as a response
to investors demands, who consider it as a desir-
able property of earnings (Beekes et al., 2004;
Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; García Lara et al.,
2007, 2009); and (3) recent research shows that
conditionally conservative accounting leads to
positive economic outcomes such as an ameliora-
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 123
5 For example, if a covenant in a debt contract demands a
minimum ROA of 2%, and true ROA is 1.9%, management
may bridge the gap between both numbers by increasing net
income artificially via accrual management that requires either
accounting (e.g. reducing the provision for bad debts for the
year) or real manipulation (e.g. relaxing credit terms to in-
crease revenues), or both. This effect may also be achieved by
selling assets, which would reduce the denominator (less as-
sets) and increase the nominator (more cash or accruals), or by
reducing discretionary expenses.
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tion of the problems derived from information
asymmetries (LaFond and Watts, 2008), or im-
provements in contracting ef ficiency (Ball et al.,
2008).
Following Basu (1997), we define conditional
conservatism as a timelier recognition of econom-
ic losses than economic gains in earnings.6 For ex-
ample, increases in the value of assets are not
reflected in the profit and loss account, while de-
creases are reflected through impairments. At the
root of this asymmetric treatment for the recogni-
tion of economic gains and losses in earnings is the
principle of conservatism or prudence that is em-
bedded into most regulatory accounting frame-
works (F ASB, 1980; IASC, 1989; ASB, 1999).
This asymmetry in recognition requirements re-
sults in earnings that reflect bad news faster than
good news (Basu, 1997). Timely loss recognition
is expected to constrain management’s opportunis-
tic payments to themselves and to other parties,
and is considered a desirable property of account-
ing earnings (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) that mit-
igates moral hazard problems.
We hypothesise that in the years prior to failure,
failed firms will show less conditionally conserva-
tive earnings than financially sound firms, because
failed firms are likely to engage in less conserva-
tive accounting practices in those years to conceal
their true economic performance (Ohlson, 1980),
and in an attempt to postpone bankruptcy . As a
consequence of this more aggressive (less conser-
vative) accounting, managers relax the require-
ments for economic gains recognition, anticipating
their recognition, while at the same time they at-
tempt to delay the recognition of losses. Failing
firms tend to have increasing inventories and in-
creasing debtors (increase in accruals with reduced
certainty of becoming cash flows). Although the
ASB Statement of Principles (1999) does not pre-
scribe conservative accounting, it states (ch. 3) 
that ‘a degree of caution’ has to be ‘applied in 
exercising the necessary judgements’. Managers
are thus expected to exercise caution and respond
to this situation by increasing bad debt provisions
and by impairing inventories. However, as pointed
out by Ohlson (1980), when failure approaches,
managers are expected to relax their conservative
policies to try to delay it. Similar to Rosner (2003),
we argue that if this is indeed the case, managers
are likely to resort to aggressive accrual manage-
ment in the years prior to failure. This aggressive
accrual management could be achieved by, for ex-
ample, not increasing bad debt provisions and not
impairing inventories adequately.
Conditional conservatism is also expected to be
affected by real earnings management. In an at-
tempt to increase earnings, managers may aggres-
sively relax credit terms, by selling on credit to
customers with high ex-ante credit risk. This
would lead to increases in the percentage of ex-
pected bad debts. Similar to the prior case, under
the framework of the ASB, managers are expected
to respond by increasing bad debt provisions.
Failure to do so in an attempt to increase earnings
would lead to aggressive instead of conservative
accounting. The joint ef fect of both accruals and
real activities manipulation in ex-post failed firms
is expected to reduce the conservatism of account-
ing numbers in these firms. Consequently , our
third and final hypothesis is as follows:
H3: Ex-post failed firms present less 
conditionally conservative earnings 
numbers than continuing firms in the years
preceding bankruptcy.
3. Research method and sample selection
procedure
We compare earnings quality between failed and
continuing firms. Earnings quality is a broad con-
cept with multiple dimensions (e.g. Al-Attar et al.,
2008; Barker and Imam, 2008). We focus on earn-
ings management and its influence on accounting
reliability, as measured by conditional conser-
vatism. Measures of earnings management and
timely loss recognition are calculated for the full
sample, to avoid biasing in favour of our hypothe-
sis that earnings quality is lower in failed firms. 7
This section provides details of the calculation of
these measures and describes the sample selection
procedure.
3.1. Measurement of accounting accruals 
manipulation
Ex-post failed firms may attempt to conceal de-
teriorating firm performance by using income-in-
creasing accounting accruals. Extant research
calculates abnormal accruals using the Jones
(1991) model in cross-section, to improve the esti-
mation of the parameters, as suggested by DeFond
124 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
6 Beaver and R yan (2005) identify two separate types of
conservatism: conditional and unconditional. It is important to
distinguish between them. They define unconditional conser-
vatism as a persistent understatement of assets due to the use
of accounting conventions at the inception of assets and lia-
bilities, such as the non-recognition of internally generated in-
tangible assets or the use of historical cost. Ball and
Shivakumar (2005) argue that unconditional conservatism in-
troduces a bias of unknown magnitude in the financial state-
ments that does not contribute to contracting efficiency. Thus,
in our study, we analyse only the conditional form.
7 Prior research on failed firms like Rosner (2003) compares
failed firms earnings quality estimates to those of matched
non-bankrupt control samples, considering only firms with
sound financial performance and avoiding cases that exhibit
net losses. Excluding distressed firms biases the procedure in
favour of finding the hypothesised result of dif ferences be-
tween failed and continuing firms, especially if a number of
continuing firms face financial problems, as happens in the
UK (Neophytou and Mar Molinero, 2004).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
 C
ar
lo
s 
Ii
i M
ad
ri
d]
 a
t 1
1:
46
 2
5 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
1 
6
and Jiambalvo (1994). The Jones model uses the
unexplained part of a regression of total accruals
on the change in revenue and gross property, plant
and equipment as a proxy for abnormal accruals.
We use the working capital version of the model
because current research indicates that manage-
ment has more discretion over current accruals,
and that manipulation of long-term accruals such
as depreciation is unlikely due to their high visi-
bility and low flexibility (Becker et al., 1998;
Young, 1999).
Aside from the working capital version of the
Jones (1991) model, we also use the modified
Jones model. The Jones (1991) model assumes
that revenues are not discretionary . That is, the
model disregards the possibility that managers
also engage in real activities manipulation, by ac-
cruing revenues before the cash is received and
when it is still questionable that the revenues have
been earned. By assuming all revenues are non-
discretionary, the Jones model removes part of the
manipulation from the abnormal accrual proxy .
Contrarily, the modified Jones model proposed by
Dechow et al. (1995) assumes that all increases in
credit sales are driven by managerial opportunis-
tic decisions and classifies them as discretionary ,
modifying the Jones model by removing the
change in receivables from the change in sales.
Dechow et al. (1995) show that their modification
ameliorates the tendency of the Jones model to
measure abnormal accruals with error when dis-
cretion is exercised over revenues. Therefore, by
using both the Jones and modified Jones models,
we are able to analyse a proxy for manipulation
capturing only ‘pure’ accounting manipulation
(that is, the Jones model), and a proxy that pools
together accounting and real activities manipula-
tion (the modified Jones model). Finally , we em-
ploy the Kasznik (1999) model, which dif fers
from the modified Jones model in that it incorpo-
rates the change in operating cash flow as an ex-
planatory variable to account for the negative
correlation between accruals and cash flows
(Dechow, 1994).
To obtain a measure of abnormal working capi-
tal accruals for all firms in industry j for year t, we
estimate the Kasznik model cross-sectionally for
all industry-year combinations with at least six ob-
servations of data, as follows:
(1)
where, WCA is working capital accruals, ∆REV is
change in sales, ∆CFO is change in cash flow from
operations and TA are total assets, and t is the time-
period indicator. Next, for each firm, we calculate
abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA) as fol-
lows:
(2)
where, α^ 0, α
^
1 and α
^
2 are the fitted industry-coeffi-
cients from equation (1) and ∆REC is the change
in accounts receivable. To run models (1) and (2),
all available observations are used, including con-
tinuing and failed firms, to avoid introducing bias-
es in the analysis. By removing the change in
receivables (∆REC) from the change in revenues
in equation (2) the model classifies as discre-
tionary accruals all changes in receivables, includ-
ing those driven by the manipulation of real
activities.
To obtain abnormal accruals measures using the
modified Jones model, we use the same procedure,
but we do not include ∆CFO as an additional vari-
able in models (1) and (2). Finally, to estimate ab-
normal accruals using the original Jones model,
we follow this last procedure (i.e. exclude ∆CFO
from the models), but without subtracting change
in accounts receivable from change in sales in the
second step. The Jones model measures discre-
tionary accruals not including the effect of real ac-
tivities manipulation, as it classifies all changes in
accounts receivables as ‘normal’ accruals.
3.1.1. Classification of observations
A key issue in our analysis of earnings manipu-
lation by ex-post bankrupt firms is whether their
attempts at masking poor performance in the years
prior to failure were successful, and whether man-
agers were able to mislead investors. To analyse if
the accruals manipulation was successful at hiding
poor performance we split sample observations in
accordance to their ex-ante failure probability. Ex-
post bankrupt firms that ex-ante do not show signs
of failure are expected to have engaged in more
aggressive accounting practices (Rosner, 2003), or
at least, in practices that successfully masked poor
performance.8 To identify them, we calculate the
ex-ante one-year-ahead probability of bankruptcy
of all failed firms. We use the Charitou et al.,
(2004) failure prediction model, which is built
using the logit methodology . The model is as fol-
lows:
(3a)
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 125
8 An alternative explanation is that ex-post failed firms with
large ex-ante failure probability do not have scope to manage
accruals given their extremely deteriorated financial condi-
tion.
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where,
(3b)
where, Pjt (Y = 1) is the probability of failure for
entity j at the end of year t; EBIT is earnings before
interest and taxes; and CFO is cash flows from op-
erations. Using this method, we obtain an ex-ante
probability that the firm would end up being bank-
rupt that we use to identify firms that are suspect
of more aggressive earnings practices. 9
3.2. Measurement of real earnings manipulation
To analyse the existence of real activities manip-
ulation we focus on one specific type of real earn-
ings management: sales manipulation, which we
measure following the method of Roychowdhury
(2006). Similar to the calculation of abnormal ac-
cruals in equations (1) and (2), the first stage con-
sists of deriving normal cash flow activity. We run
the following cross-sectional regression for every
industry-year combination with at least six obser-
vations of data:
(4)
where all variables are defined as before. For every
observation, abnormal cash flow ( ACFO) is ob-
tained by subtracting from actual firm CFO the
normal CFO calculated using the estimated β^ co-
efficients from equation (4). The procedure is the
same as the one previously explained for estimat-
ing a firm’ s abnormal accruals. Once ACFO
has been estimated, we adapt the method by
Roychowdhury (2006) to compare cash flow be-
haviour in suspect firms – in our case, the failed
firms – with the sample of continuing firms as fol-
lows:
(5)
where SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of
total assets, NetIncome is net income scaled by be-
ginning-of-period total assets, and FAILING is a
dummy indicator taking the value of 1 if the firm
goes bankrupt; 0 otherwise, and t is the time-peri-
od indicator. If failed firms manipulate sales up-
wards by offering more lenient credit terms, then it
is expected that the level of cash flow will be ab-
normally low , given the level of sales. Thus, if
failed firms are manipulating their sales, δ3 will be
negative and significant, consistent with an abnor-
mally low level of CFO, given the reported sales.
3.3. Measurement of conditional conservatism
Both accounting accruals and real activities ma-
nipulation are likely to result in a reduction of
timely loss recognition in failed firms. To measure
the dif ferential recognition speed of economic
gains and losses in earnings we use the time series
and accruals-based measures of conditional con-
servatism developed by Ball and Shivakumar
(2005).
3.3.1. Time series tests based on the persistence
of income changes
Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
argue that the asymmetric recognition of econom-
ic gains and losses in earnings leads to dif ferences
in the persistence of gains and losses. Losses are
less persistent as their timely recognition makes
them appear as one-time shocks to earnings, while
gains are reflected only when cash flows are re-
alised, and, consequently, they are seen as perma-
nent earnings components. This leads Basu (1997:
20) to argue that ‘negative earnings changes have
a greater tendency to reverse in the following peri-
od than positive earnings changes’. The tendency
of negative earnings changes to reverse is docu-
mented by Brooks and Buckmaster (1976) and
Elgers and Lo (1994).
Using the Basu (1997) method as a starting
point,10 Ball and Shivakumar (2005) develop a
model to measure timely incorporation of gains
and losses in accounting income ‘as the tendency
for increases and decreases in earnings to reverse’
(p. 92). We follow Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
and estimate the following model for our full sam-
ple:
(6)
126 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
9 We do not use Altman’s (1968) Z-score model because it
is built using LDA, a technique that makes strong demands on
the structure of data. First, it requires that the financial ratios
are normally distributed. This is known not to be the case
(Ezzamel and Mar Molinero, 1987). Also, the ratios of failed
companies should have the same variance-covariance struc-
tures as those of continuing firms. Richardson and Davidson
(1983; 1984) show this assumption does not hold in the con-
text of failure prediction. Furthermore, we do not use a model
developed with US data for UK firms since there are signifi-
cant differences between the reporting practices and insolven-
cy codes of the two countries (Charitou et al., 2004). Finally ,
Mensah (1984) finds distress prediction models to be funda-
mentally unstable: coef ficients varying according to the un-
derlying health of the economy. Thus model derivation should
be as close in time as possible to the period over which pre-
dictions are made.
10 We do not use the Basu (1997) model as FAME does not
provide share prices for most of our sample of bankrupt firms.
In addition, several studies including Dietrich et al., (2007)
recommend the use of non-market-based versions of Basu
specifications, such as the ones in Ball and Shivakumar
(2005).
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where ∆NetIncomet (∆NetIncomet–1) is change in
net income from fiscal year t-1 to t (t-2 to t-1),
scaled by beginning-of-period total assets.
DNetIncome is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if the prior-year change in net income is
negative; 0 otherwise. Year is a dummy variable
for the fiscal year.
As described by Ball and Shivakumar (2005:
92), ‘if gains are recognised in an untimely
(smoothed) manner, they will be persistent compo-
nents of net income that tend not to reverse and
thus, φ2 will be equal to zero’. That is, under con-
servative accounting, they expect φ2 = 0. If man-
agers choose aggressive accounting methods and
foster good news recognition, positive income
changes will behave as ‘temporary earnings com-
ponents that tend to reverse’. In our setting, where
we compare ex-post failed with continuing firms,
we expect that the φ2 coefficient will equal zero for
continuing firms, as they will be conditionally
conservative as required by accounting standards.
However, for ex-post failed firms it will be signif-
icantly negative (φ2 < 0) if they engage, as expect-
ed, in income-increasing accounting practices to
conceal poor performance and postpone bankrupt-
cy. Regarding economic losses, their timely recog-
nition implies that ‘they are recognised as
transitory income decreases, and hence reverse’
(Ball and Shivakumar , 2005: 92). As they show ,
the implication is that φ3 will be negative.
However, given that failed firms engage in aggres-
sive accounting policies (φ2 < 0), in our setting we
expect failed firms to show a significantly positive
φ3 (φ3 > 0) if they delay the recognition of eco-
nomic losses to the point that economic gains are
reflected in earnings faster than economic losses.
A positive φ3 implies economic losses are more
persistent than economic gains. That is, firms de-
viate from conservative accounting and recognise
losses in earnings at a slower pace than gains.
3.3.2. Accruals-based tests
As developed in Ball and Shivakumar (2005),
asymmetric gain and loss recognition results in an
asymmetry in accruals, ‘because economic losses
are more likely to be recognised on a timely basis
as unrealised (i.e. non-cash) accrued char ges
against income. Economic gains are more likely to
be recognised when realised, and hence accounted
for on a cash basis.’ (p. 94). As a final test, follow-
ing Ball and Shivakumar (2005) we estimate the
model:
(7)
where TACC is total accruals divided by beginning
of period total assets; CFO is cash flow from op-
erations divided by beginning-of-period total as-
sets; DC is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if CFO is negative, and 0 otherwise. Year is a
dummy variable for the fiscal year . Given that
Dechow (1994) and Dechow et al. (1998) docu-
ment a negative relation between accruals and cash
flows, and that this negative relation is embedded
in the very same nature of the accounting process
(accruals reverse), Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
expect a negative γ2, reflecting the negative asso-
ciation between accruals and cash flows. Ball and
Shivakumar (2005: 94) predict a positive γ3 under
the hypothesis that accrued losses are more likely
when the firm presents negative cash flows. That
is, under conditional conservatism, in the case of
economic losses, the decrease in earnings and the
decrease in cash flows happen in the same period,
and, consequently , the negative correlation be-
tween accruals and cash flows decrease in bad
news periods. This is captured by a positive γ3. Our
prediction is that failed firms have lower quality
earnings than continuing firms, and therefore, are
less likely to recognise losses as transitory items.
This implies lower asymmetry , and thus, γ3 is ex-
pected to be lower for failed firms. In the case of
aggressive accounting, γ3 would be negative. If
managers manipulate earnings upwards (by releas-
ing negative accruals or decreasing cost of goods
sold) this would increase the negative association
between accruals and cash flows, even in bad news
periods, contributing to a negative γ3 (aggressive
accounting). If managers engage in real earnings
management, and increase sales (and therefore,
debtors) but not cash flows, this would again trans-
late into creating more positive accruals in periods
of negative cash flows, again contributing to a
negative association between accruals and cash
flows even in bad news periods, that is, to a nega-
tive γ3. Consequently , income-increasing strate-
gies, both through accounting or real earnings
manipulation, lead to a negative γ3 coefficient.11
Accrual behaviour in years of positive cash
flows is expected to be different in failed and con-
tinuing firms too. If managerial behaviour in failed
firms results in accruals manipulation to increase
earnings, this would translate into earnings captur-
ing economic gains faster , and thus, the negative
association between cash flows and accruals
would be reduced. Consequently, we expect a neg-
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 127
11 Exogenous economic events may contribute as well to
this negative γ3 coefficient. An example of these economic
events would be if a major customer suddenly slows down
payment without any sales management involved, leading to
lower cash flows as compared to sales. The firm may decide
not to make a provision against this slower payment. If the
firm ran into a cash flow crisis, we would also observe a neg-
ative association between cash flows and accruals in the
model, a symptom of aggressive accounting. Thus, the model
captures cases of aggressive accounting, regardless of the ori-
gin and motive of the underlying economic events.
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9
ative coef ficient on γ2 for failed and continuing
firms, but smaller in absolute value for failed firms.
3.4. Sample selection procedure
Financial statement data are collected from the
FAME database. FAME contains detailed informa-
tion on public (quoted at either the London Stock
Exchange’s Primary Market or at the Alternative
Investment Market (AIM)) and private firms in the
UK and Ireland. All British publicly quoted firms
included in the database ‘Active company file’ at
the time of data collection entered our continuing
sample. Where available, we collected data for
these firms as far back as 1990. The continuing
sample with full data available consists of 2,801
firms.
UK publicly quoted firms that received an ad-
ministration order, went into receivership, or were
liquidated, as per the Insolvency Act 1986, were
identified from the FAME database ‘Inactive com-
pany file’.12 Furthermore, for a failed firm to qual-
ify for our sample, it had to declare insolvency
between 1998 and 2004, and to have at least three
years of full financial data prior to its collapse. We
exclude finance, insurance and real estate firms
(division H, 60–67, of US SIC code system), as
firms operating in these industries are structurally
different and their financial reporting practices
generally preclude combining them with non-fi-
nancial firms (Gilbert et al., 1990). We also ex-
clude duplicates and observations with missing
data to run our earnings management tests.
These criteria result in 268 failed firms with full
data available. From those, 77 went into adminis-
tration, 81 into receivership, and 110 were liquida-
tions. We cannot distinguish between firms in the
main market and AIM as once firms become inac-
tive FAME classifies them as ‘Quoted Inactive’.
Table 1 summarises the sample selection proce-
dure and provides a classification of observations
across types of failure.13
4. Empirical results
4.1. Accruals manipulation in failed vs. 
continuing firms
Using the method described in Section 3.1.1
above, we first classify failed firm-year observa-
tions that have an ex-ante probability of failure
lower than 15% as having a low probability
128 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 1
Sample selection procedure and distribution of observations
Panel A: Sample selection procedure
Firm-years Firms
Firms with data available in FAME entering bankruptcy 1998–2004 1,068 352
Less: Firms with less than three years of data previous to bankruptcy (49) (32)
Finance, real estate and insurance firms (63) (21)
Duplicated firms (56) (11)
Firms with missing data to calculate abnormal accruals (66) (20)
Failed firms with data to run earnings management tests 834 268
Continuing firms with full data available in FAME 1995–2004 14,742 2,801
Panel B: Distribution of failed firms by type of failur e
Administration Liquidation Receivership Total
Number of firms 77 110 81 268
(proportion) (28.73%) (41.04%) (30.23%)
Number of firm-years 234 331 269 834
(proportion) (28.06%) (39.69%) (32.25%)
Notes
Failed firms are obtained from the FAME ‘inactive companies’ file. Abnormal Accruals are abnormal working
capital accruals as calculated using the Kasznik (1999) model.
12 From the ‘Inactive company’ file we choose companies
registered in the UK, and select ‘public companies’ (‘legal
form’) including only receiverships, administrations and 
liquidations. To confirm the nature of the failure and its formal
date we look at announcements from other sources (e.g. press
announcements). The list of failed firms is available from the
authors upon request.
13 Auditors play a significant role in ensuring financial state-
ment quality, reducing the incidence of earnings management
(Becker et al., 1998) and opportunistic loss deferrals (Chung 
et al., 2003). We do not consider the monitoring role of 
auditors in our study due to insuf ficient data. Out of our 
sample of failed firms, 25 observations received a qualified
opinion (19 of them in t-1), 277 an unqualified opinion and for
all others data were not available. The year prior to bankruptcy,
10.1% of failed firms received a qualified opinion, while 39.7%
received an unqualified opinion and no data were available for
the remaining firms.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of sample firms
Panel A: Continuing firms (N=14,742)
Mean Median Std. Dev Q1 Q3 Min. Max.
Size 9.686 9.272 2.202 8.031 10.978 6.099 15.878
Revenue 2.098 1.650 3.005 0.958 2.685 0.054 8.676
Net income 0.026 0.043 0.779 0.001 0.097 –0.715 0.487
Cash flow 0.071 0.092 0.654 0.002 0.180 –0.932 0.675
Total accruals –0.045 –0.055 0.606 –0.119 0.013 –0.551 0.694
Working cap. accruals 0.003 –0.017 0.434 –0.067 0.047 –0.498 0.739
Abnormal accruals 0.003 0.001 0.167 –0.037 0.041 –0.334 0.333
Failure probability 0.361 0.127 0.403 0.004 0.821 0.000 1.000
Panel B: HighP failed firms (N=612)
Mean Median Std. Dev Q1 Q3 Min. Max.
Size 8.777 8.516 1.536 7.665 9.553 6.441 14.314
Revenue 2.585 2.234 1.705 1.506 3.291 0.303 9.103
Net income –0.060 0.001 0.231 –0.074 0.036 –1.155 0.219
Cash flow 0.007 0.035 0.239 –0.063 0.115 –1.025 0.450
Total accruals –0.066 –0.073 0.197 –0.149 0.015 –0.815 0.447
Working cap. accruals –0.014 –0.023 0.192 –0.093 0.063 –0.539 0.529
Abnormal accruals –0.036 –0.027 0.113 –0.076 0.013 –0.391 0.204
Failure probability 0.781 0.910 0.259 0.617 0.991 0.165 1.000
Panel C: LowP failed firms (N=222)
Mean Median Std. Dev Q1 Q3 Min. Max.
Size 8.982 8.870 1.736 7.671 10.059 5.767 14.259
Revenue 2.619 1.946 2.111 1.285 3.531 0.073 11.756
Net income 0.071 0.063 0.204 0.014 0.119 –0.526 0.707
Cash flow 0.123 0.117 0.283 0.012 0.211 –0.803 1.094
Total accruals –0.051 –0.068 0.211 –0.140 0.013 –0.475 0.657
Working cap. accruals –0.001 –0.017 0.205 –0.085 0.059 –0.411 0.687
Abnormal accruals 0.017 0.001 0.118 –0.052 0.066 –0.309 0.394
Failure probability 0.030 0.009 0.040 0.001 0.051 0.000 0.136
Notes
HighP (LowP) are failed firms with a high (low) ex-ante probability of failure. A high (low) probability is set
up as being higher or equal (lower) than 15%.
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. All other variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets:
Revenue is sales. Working Cap Accruals is working capital accruals. Failure Probability is the probability that
a firm will go bankrupt calculated as in Charitou et al. (2004). Abnormal Accruals is a measure of firm abnor-
mal working capital accruals calculated using the Kasznik (1999) model. Firms are classified as (1) Continuing
if they do not go bankrupt during the considered period (1998–2004), (2) Failed (LowP) if they go bankrupt
and their ex-ante bankruptcy probability of going bankrupt is below 15%; or (3) Failed (HighP) if they go
bankrupt and their ex-ante bankruptcy probability of going bankrupt is equal or above 15%.
(LowP) of failure, and all others as having a high
probability (HighP) of failure.14
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of sample
firms. Continuing firms have a median (mean)
probability of bankruptcy of 12.7% (36.1%).
Failed firms are split between LowP and HighP
firm-year observations.15 HighP firms have a me-
dian (mean) probability of bankruptcy of 91.0%
(78.1%), whilst LowP firms have a probability of
1% (3%). A more detailed look at the descriptive
statistics reveals that LowP firms have higher net
income (NI) and cash from operations (CFO) than
both continuing and HighP firms. Interestingly ,
HighP firms have, on average, higher sales relative
14 Observations are classified almost identically if we in-
crease the threshold of failure to 20% or even 25%.
15 Throughout the text we make reference to HighP and
LowP firms for simplicity. It would be more correct to use the
terms HighP and LowP firm-year observations.
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130 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of failed firms by year of bankruptcy
Panel A: t-4
LowP failed firms HighP failed firms p-value difference
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Medians
Size 8.654 8.137 1.438 9.471 9.416 1.034 (0.18) (0.13)
Revenue 1.183 1.082 0.921 2.098 1.878 1.405 (0.13) (0.19)
Net income 0.025 0.013 0.083 –0.001 0.006 0.026 (0.26) (0.45)
Cash flow 0.064 0.103 0.082 0.110 0.121 0.104 (0.24) (0.27)
Total accruals –0.039 –0.059 0.062 –0.112 –0.114 0.090 (0.09) (0.19)
Working cap. accruals –0.007 –0.037 0.064 –0.040 –0.038 0.039 (0.20) (0.27)
Failure probability 0.014 0.003 0.023 0.612 0.606 0.259 (0.00) (0.01)
Panel B: t-3
LowP failed firms HighP failed firms p-value difference
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Medians
Size 9.269 9.259 1.484 8.797 8.249 1.654 (0.03) (0.01)
Revenue 2.675 1.958 2.184 2.823 2.228 1.953 (0.33) (0.10)
Net income 0.098 0.073 0.234 0.001 0.011 0.084 (0.00) (0.01)
Cash flow 0.174 0.134 0.304 0.030 0.024 0.134 (0.00) (0.01)
Total accruals –0.076 –0.079 0.164 –0.029 –0.032 0.140 (0.03) (0.02)
Working cap. accruals –0.023 –0.021 0.160 0.014 0.006 0.140 (0.06) (0.03)
Failure probability 0.030 0.006 0.042 0.742 0.847 0.269 (0.00) (0.00)
Panel C: t-2
LowP failed firms HighP failed firms p-value difference
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Medians
Size 9.070 8.964 1.804 8.923 8.673 1.558 (0.28) (0.26)
Revenue 2.436 1.834 1.623 2.592 2.396 1.346 (0.25) (0.08)
Net income 0.087 0.049 0.190 –0.030 0.003 0.124 (0.00) (0.00)
Cash flow 0.160 0.137 0.257 0.039 0.064 0.143 (0.00) (0.00)
Total accruals –0.073 –0.075 0.149 –0.069 –0.080 0.113 (0.40) (0.46)
Working cap. accruals –0.024 –0.021 0.152 –0.020 –0.030 0.115 (0.41) (0.47)
Failure probability 0.033 0.010 0.044 0.742 0.907 0.288 (0.00) (0.00)
Panel D: t-1
LowP failed firms HighP failed firms p-value difference
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Medians
Size 8.977 8.782 1.967 8.813 8.597 1.458 (0.25) (0.39)
Revenue 2.272 1.636 1.781 2.376 1.999 1.659 (0.35) (0.14)
Net income 0.015 0.021 0.209 –0.106 –0.040 0.192 (0.00) (0.00)
Cash flow 0.074 0.093 0.258 0.011 0.036 0.196 (0.03) (0.00)
Total accruals –0.059 –0.101 0.292 –0.117 –0.100 0.169 (0.04) (0.19)
Working cap. accruals –0.015 –0.042 0.283 –0.065 –0.053 0.172 (0.06) (0.27)
Failure probability 0.041 0.021 0.045 0.865 0.966 0.211 (0.00) (0.01)
Notes
HighP (LowP) are failed firms with a high (low) ex-ante probability of failure. A high (low) probability is set
up as being higher or equal (lower) than 15%. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Revenue is sales.
Working cap. accruals is working capital accruals. Failure probability is the probability that a firm will go
bankrupt calculated as in Charitou et al. (2004). Abnormal accruals is a measure of firm abnormal working
capital accruals calculated using the Kasznik (1999) model. Firms are classified as (1) Continuing if they do
not go bankrupt during the considered period (1998–2004), (2) Failed (LowP) if they go bankrupt and their ex-
ante bankruptcy probability of going bankrupt is below 15%; or (3) Failed (HighP) if they go bankrupt and
their ex-ante bankruptcy probability of going bankrupt is equal or above 15%.
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to cash flow than both LowP and continuing firms.
The difference in mean and median CFO between
these groups is significant at the 1% level using a
t- and a Wilcoxon-test, respectively, while the dif-
ference in median sales is significant at the 5%
level (p-value=0.022). This initial evidence is con-
sistent with the sales manipulation hypothesis.
LowP firms have significantly higher AWCAs than
HighP firms, suggesting that LowP firms are po-
tentially more successful at hiding their distress
from the market, and can therefore manage earn-
ings more aggressively than the sub-set of HighP
firms, which show more signs of being distressed.
The difference in mean and median abnormal ac-
cruals between the HighP and LowP groups is sig-
nificant at the 1% level, ( t=4.28, and Z=4.61).
Tables 3 and 4 analyse the evolution of key fi-
nancial indicators during the years prior to bank-
ruptcy for HighP and LowP firms. Extant research
on bankruptcy suggests that significant differences
exist between the accounting numbers of failed
and non-failed firms up to five years before bank-
ruptcy (Beaver , 1966). However , we expect that
some firms (those classified as LowP) retain suffi-
cient scope to manipulate their numbers, and thus,
may successfully appear as healthy in the years
prior to bankruptcy. Such successful manipulation
could af fect the classification performance of
bankruptcy models, especially for a great number
of firms that lie in what Jones (1987) refers to as
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Table 4
Yearly differences in abnormal accruals
Panel A: t-4
Expected LowP vs. HighP LowP vs. Cont Failed vs. Cont
sign of Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
difference (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Abnormal accruals (+) 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.07) (0.91) (0.92)
Panel B: t-3
Expected LowP vs. HighP LowP vs. Cont Failed vs. Cont
sign of Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
difference (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Abnormal accruals (+) 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 –0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.05) (0.27) (0.10)
Panel C: t-2
Expected LowP vs. HighP LowP vs. Cont Failed vs. Cont
sign of Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
difference (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Abnormal accruals (+) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 –0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.41) (0.12) (0.19)
Panel D: t-1
Expected LowP vs. HighP LowP vs. Cont Failed vs. Cont
sign of Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
difference (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Abnormal accruals (–) –0.05 –0.04 –0.05 –0.05 –0.04 –0.03
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes
Firms are classified as (1) Cont (continuing) if they do not go bankrupt during the period studied (1998–2004),
(2) LowP if they go bankrupt and their ex-ante probability of failing is below 15%; or (3) HighP if they go
bankrupt and their ex-ante probability of failing is equal to or above 15%. To compare failed and continuing
firms, every failed firm-year is matched to the average abnormal accruals of continuing firms in the same in-
dustry and year.
Reported p-values are for a one-tail test of differences, calculated using a t-test for the means, and a Wilcoxon
test for the medians.
Abnormal accruals are abnormal working capital accruals as measured by the Kasznik (1999) model.
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the ‘grey’ area.
Table 3, Panels A to D show the evolution of some
basic financial indicators of LowP and HighP
firms from four years prior to bankruptcy ( t-4)
until the year prior to the event (t-1), where t is the
year of bankruptcy . In year t-4 the only relevant
difference between LowP and HighP firms is on
their ex-ante probability of failure. However , as
bankruptcy approaches (years t-3 to t-1), LowP
firms manage to stay more profitable (higher net
income, cash flows and less negative accruals)
than HighP firms. This evidence could be consis-
tent with LowP firms successfully manipulating
their earnings upwards prior to bankruptcy.
Table 4 analyses the evolution of abnormal ac-
cruals (calculated with the Kasznik, 1999 model),
comparing LowP with continuing and HighP
firms, as well as continuing firms with all failed
firms grouped together . To compare failed and
continuing firms, every failed firm-year is
matched to the average abnormal accruals of con-
tinuing firms in the same industry and year . LowP
firms are expected to manage earnings more ag-
gressively than HighP and continuing firms. If
they manipulate their earnings successfully in the
years preceding bankruptcy , it is expected that in
the fourth, third and second years before the fail-
ure event (i.e. t-4 to t-2) the dif ference in mean
(median) AWCA will be positive. However , be-
cause these firms end up being bankrupt, there
should be a reversal of the previously manipulated
accruals in the year just before bankruptcy ( t-1),
and thus, the dif ference in AWCA should become
negative in this last year . In accordance with our
expectations, Table 4, Panels A to C show that the
differences between LowP and HighP are signifi-
cantly positive from t-4 to t-2. This is consistent
with LowP firms manipulating earnings upwards
in the years prior to failure. Also in line with our
predictions, we can observe that the difference be-
comes negative the year just before bankruptcy 
(t-1). The results of year t-1, with a larger reversal
of accruals for LowP firms are consistent with
larger income-increasing earnings management in
prior years. These results also discard the alterna-
tive explanation for the existence of the relatively
large number of LowP firms that these firms are
not real failures but voluntary liquidations.
The dif ferences in AWCA between LowP and
continuing firms presented in the middle column
of Table 4 follow a similar pattern, albeit the sig-
nificance is slightly lower . Overall, the evidence
supports our hypothesis that managers of distressed
companies engage in earnings management to
conceal their poor performance and, as bankruptcy
looms closer and no improvement in the situation
is observed, they eventually exhaust their instru-
ments for successful accrual manipulation, and an
accumulation of bad news will be observed.
The last column of Table 4 shows the difference
in AWCA between all failed firms ( LowP and
HighP combined) and continuing firms. The dif-
ferences are not significant except for t-1, where
negative accruals accumulate both for LowP and
HighP firms. Thus, whilst LowP firms show signs
of having aggressive accounting policies in place,
HighP firms are likely to have exhausted their re-
sources for successful manipulation, having aver-
age negative abnormal accruals (as shown on
Table 2), compensating those of the LowP firms
when all failed firms are pooled together. These re-
sults might imply that HighP firms are being
closely monitored by the market as obvious cases
of distress companies, whilst the market might not
monitor LowP firms as closely, permitting a high-
er degree of manipulation in these companies.
Our results are robust to the use of other models
of discretionary accruals. Specifically , we use the
modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995), and
the original Jones (1991) model. The modified
Jones model classifies all increases in debtors as
discretionary accruals, consequently capturing both
pure accounting manipulation and real activities
manipulation. The Jones (1991) model captures
only pure accounting manipulation, as it classifies
all increases in debtors as normal accruals.
4.2. Real activities manipulation
Table 5, Panel A reports parameter estimates of
running equation (4) to identify abnormally low
cash flow levels relative to sales. We obtain results
consistent with previous research by
Roychowdhury (2006).16 Table 5, Panel B reports
descriptive statistics of normal (NCFO) and abnor-
mal cash flow from operations (ACFO). These de-
scriptive statistics are also consistent with
previous research. Table 5, Panel C reports results
of running equation (5) for sample firms. In accor-
dance with our predictions, δ3 is significantly 
negative, consistent with failed firms having, on
average, negative abnormal cash flows, given their
reported levels of sales. HighP firms have the
highest median level of sales of all firms in the
sample (see Table 2); however, these sales do not
create the expected level of cash flows. In fact,
cash flows from operations in failed firms are 
abnormally low.
These results, combined with those of the prior
section, provide some evidence consistent with the
132 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
16 Whilst the calculation of abnormal accruals is a standard
procedure in the literature, the calculation of abnormal cash
flows (ACFO) is not yet so. Thus, we provide the results of
running equation (4) and descriptive statistics of ACFO and
NCFO. ACFO are calculated for the full sample of data avail-
able (20,049 observations) to avoid biasing the estimates of
normal and abnormal CFO. Equation (5) is run for the set of
firms with full data to run our earnings management tests
(15,654 observations, see Table 1 for details).
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existence of potential preferences and trade-offs in
choosing earnings management instruments. We
show that HighP firms, having probably exhausted
their opportunities for successful accrual (purely
accounting) manipulation, resort to real actions
that lead to an abnormal relation between cash
flows and sales. This abnormal relation could be
partly attributable to increases in sales through 
extended credit terms, beyond what could be 
considered ‘normal’ in the industry.
4.3. Conditional conservatism in ex-post failed
firms
Results from tests of timely loss recognition
using time-series tests (T able 6) and accruals-
based tests (Table 7) are consistent with managers
of failed firms engaging in pure accounting ma-
nipulation, and also in real activities manipulation
to boost earnings. This translates into less condi-
tionally conservative earnings.
Table 6 shows the results of running equation (6)
for the sample of continuing firms, the whole sam-
ple of failed firms, and the three sub-samples of
failed firms in years prior to failure ( t-1, t-2 and 
t-3). The results show a distinct dif ferent behav-
iour between continuing and failed firms. As pre-
dicted by Ball and Shivakumar (2005), the φ2
coefficient of continuing firms, consistent with
conditionally conservative accounting, is very
close to zero and not significant. Timelier recogni-
tion of economic gains leads to a significantly neg-
ative φ2 coefficient. This is the case when we look
at the failed firms. Also, if we look at the coef fi-
cient capturing the recognition of economic losses
(φ3) we can see that, for continuing firms, the co-
efficient is, as expected, significantly negative
showing the asymmetric nature of earnings and the
more contemporaneous recognition of economic
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Table 5
Abnormal cash flow (ACFO) activity in failed firms
Panel A: Estimation of ACFO. Model parameters
Intercept β1 β2 Adj. R-sq N
Parameter 0.0003 0.0711 –0.0345 0.43 20,049
t-stat (0.12) (3.09) (–0.50)
Panel B: Abnormal and normal CFO
Mean Median Std. Dev Q1 Q3 N
Abnormal CFO 0.006 0.022 0.198 –0.069 0.103 20,049
Normal CFO 0.074 0.063 0.079 0.029 0.109 20,049
Panel C: Comparison of failed (HighP) firms with the all other firms
Intercept δ1 δ2 δ3 Adj. R-sq N
Parameter 0.072 –0.001 0.012 –0.083 0.23 15,654
t-stat (8.71) (–1.36) (2.43) (–21.45)
Notes
Panel A presents results of running equation (4) cross-sectionally:
where, CFO is cash flow from operations, TA is total assets, and REV is total sales. There are 380 industry-year
combinations from 1993 to 2003 with at least 6 observations per industry; the average industry-year group has
53 observations. This panel reports mean coefficients, t-stats and R2 across all industry-years.
Panel B reports abnormal and normal CFO estimates. Abnormal CFO (ACFO) is obtained subtracting from ac-
tual CFO the expected or normal firm CFO, which is obtained using the industry specific coef ficients derived
from equation (4) above.
Panel C shows results of running equation (5) for sample firms
where, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, NI is net income scaled by beginning-of-period total assets,
and FAILING is a dummy indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm goes bankrupt, 0 otherwise. Reported
t-statistics are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent.
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losses than economic gains in earnings. However ,
there is again a shift in the sign of the coef ficient
for failed firms, consistent with more aggressive
accounting policies when financial health is in
trouble. The difference in the φ2 and φ3 coefficients
between continuing firms and the dif ferent sets of
failed firms is significant at conventional levels in
the first and second year before failure when we
calculate the significance of the dif ference be-
tween failed and continuing firms using the ap-
proach in Giner and Rees (2001). When we use the
more standard (and more restrictive) Chow test,
we obtain similar results.
When we analyse economic gains and losses
recognition in earnings by looking at the relation
between accruals and cash flows (Table 7), we can
see that, as predicted by Dechow (1994), Dechow
et al. (1998) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005),
there is a negative association between accruals
and cash flows for all firms (negative and signifi-
cant γ2). Consistent also with our hypothesis of
failed firms using more aggressive accounting, the
γ2 coefficient is significantly larger (smaller in ab-
solute value) in failed than in continuing firms.
Finally, the γ3 coefficient, capturing the asymmetry
in the recognition of economic gains and losses in
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Table 6
Time series test of timeliness in loss r ecognition in continuing and failed firms
Failed
Continuing total Total t-1 t-2 t-3
Constant (φ0) –0.03 –0.05 –0.05 –0.05 0.04
(t-stat) –8.37 –3.79 –1.62 –2.63 0.66
DNetIncomet–1 (φ1) –0.04 0.02 –0.02 0.03 –0.11
(t-stat) –1.80 1.22 –0.59 1.46 –1.67
∆NetIncomet–1 (φ2) 0.01 –0.32 –0.89 –0.24 –0.44
(t-stat) 0.44 –2.30 –2.64 –2.26 –2.27
DNt–1 ∆NIt–1 (φ3) –0.76 0.40 1.07 0.20 –0.47
(t-stat) –3.23 2.14 2.86 1.31 –0.76
t-stat diff. φ2 cont vs failed 2.34 2.66 2.30 2.31
t-stat diff. φ3 cont vs failed –3.86 –4.14 –3.42 –0.28
Chow test (F-stat) diff. φ2 cont vs failed (p-val) 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.21
Chow test (F-stat) diff. φ3 cont vs failed (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.94
Adj. R2 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.09
N. Obs. 14,227 340 151 133 56
Notes
We run equation (6):
where ∆NI is change in net income from fiscal year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning-of-period total assets. DN is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the prior-year change in net income is negative; 0 otherwise. Year
is a dummy variable for the fiscal year .
t-statistics are White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent.
We estimate the statistical significance of the differences between coefficients from different regressions using
two procedures:
a) As in Giner and Rees (2001), we use the following statistic (distributed as a student t): θ1–θ2 divided by
where θi is the estimated coefficient and σi the standard error for variable i.
b) The more standard Chow (W ald) test. This specification is based on running a pooled regression with
dummy variables to identify the different samples (in our case, failed vs continuing). As pointed out by Giner
and Rees (2001 footnote 5) this approach assumes that the variance of the error across groups is the same.
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Table 7
Accruals-based test of loss recognition in continuing and failed firms
Failed
Continuing total Total t-1 t-2 t-3
Constant (γ0) 0.06 –0.07 –0.07 –0.05 –0.05
(t-stat) 5.16 –6.14 –3.70 –4.58 –2.68
DCFOt (γ1) 0.15 –0.03 –0.08 –0.01 0.02
(t-stat) 2.21 –0.74 –1.78 –0.20 0.52
CFOt (γ2) –0.91 –0.28 –0.50 –0.29 –0.20
(t-stat) –13.06 –4.21 –5.14 –4.70 –3.23
DCFOt CFOt (γ3) 1.32 –0.92 –0.74 –1.00 –0.99
(t-stat) 4.01 –2.80 –2.25 –2.86 –1.63
t-stat diff. γ2 cont vs failed –6.68 –3.47 –6.60 –8.09
t-stat diff. γ3 cont vs failed 4.65 4.19 3.96 3.65
Chow test (F-stat) diff. γ2 cont vs failed (p-val) 0.02 0.64 0.04 0.00
Chow test (F-stat) diff. γ3 cont vs failed (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj. R2 0.52 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.44
N. Obs. 14,227 340 151 133 56
Notes
We run equation (7):
where TACC is total accruals divided by beginning of period total assets; CFO is cash flow from operations di-
vided by beginning-of-period total assets; DC is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CFO is negative,
and 0 otherwise. Year is a dummy variable for the fiscal year .
t-statistics are White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent.
We estimate the statistical significance of the differences between coefficients from different regressions using
two procedures:
a) As in Giner and Rees (2001), we use the following statistic (distributed as a student t): θ1–θ2 divided by
where θi is the estimated coefficient and σi the standard error for variable i.
b) The more standard Chow (W ald) test. This specification is based on running a pooled regression with
dummy variables to identify the different samples (in our case, failed vs continuing). As pointed out by Giner
and Rees (2001 footnote 5) this approach assumes that the variance of the error across groups is the same.
earnings is, consistent with conservative account-
ing, significantly positive for continuing firms.
However, this is not the case for failed firms,
where the coef ficient is significantly negative.
This negative γ3 coefficient is consistent with a
faster recognition of economic gains than econom-
ics losses, and with aggressive (instead of conser-
vative) accounting.17 These aggressive (instead of
conservative) earnings may be the result of: (1)
managers in failed firms using accruals to increase
earnings (pure accounting manipulation, release of
negative accruals, decrease of cost of goods sold),
which decreases the predicted negative association
between earnings and cash flows; and (2) man-
agers in failed firms relaxing credit policies to in-
crease sales without recognising the proper bad
debt provisions (real activities manipulation to-
gether with improper accounting policies). The
difference in the conservative measures between
failed and continuing firms is always significant at
17 Notice that the number of observations from Tables 6 and
7 differ slightly from the sample used for the earnings man-
agement tests due to data requirements to estimate models 6
(time series tests) and 7 (accruals-based tests). If we allow the
sample to differ between Tables 6 and 7, we increase substan-
tially the sample size to estimate model 7 (as we have more
stringent data requirements for model 6, Table 6), obtaining up
to 514 firm-year observations for failed firms. Results of tests
using this larger sample do not dif fer significantly from those
reported in Table 7.
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least at a 1% level when using the Giner and Rees
(2001) approach. The Chow test of fers the same
results, except for the good news coefficient in the
year prior to failure, where the difference between
failed and continuing firms is not significant. 18
Overall, our results from Tables 6 and 7 show
that managers of ex-post failed firms delay the
recognition of economic losses and anticipate the
recognition of economic gains in an attempt to
delay bankruptcy.
5. Summary and conclusions
This paper analyses earnings quality in a lar ge
sample of UK bankrupt firms. We find that ex-post
failed firms engage in earnings manipulation
which may begin up to four years prior to failure.
We argue that this manipulation responds to man-
agers’ attempts at concealing poor performance.
We show that managers use two dif ferent tools to
achieve this objective: purely accounting (accru-
als) manipulation and real activities manipulation.
Our study adds to the literature on the quality of
earnings reported by ex-post failed firms in sever-
al ways: (1) we analyse two dif ferent aspects of
earnings manipulation: accounting manipulation
and real activity manipulation. We show managers
resort to both, but use more aggressive real activi-
ties manipulation when their failure probability is
high. This is consistent with arguments in prior lit-
erature that managers see real activities manipula-
tion as more costly , and use it only when the
available accounting discretion has been used up.
(2) We also provide evidence on the timing of the
manipulation, as we show it starts four years prior
to failure, and unravels in the year just before fail-
ure; (3) we show that the manipulation is success-
ful in hiding poor performance (firms with low
ex-ante failure probability show aggressive accru-
als management), which highlights the need for
better corporate governance provisions and en-
forcement of accounting standards, and opens the
door for further research on failure prediction
models that explicitly control for earnings man-
agement practices; (4) we demonstrate that ex-post
failed firms report less conditionally conservative
earnings, which implies increased agency prob-
lems; and finally, (5) we use a UK sample, where
the insolvency code allows for a wider definition
of bankruptcy, with different implications, than in
the US (Franks et al., 1996; Bradbury, 2007).
Regarding our finding that failed firms with a
low ex-ante failure probability manage earnings
more aggressively, it is very likely that it is pre-
cisely the manipulation of earnings that deter-
mines the low probability of failure. This result has
important regulatory implications, as it suggests
that monitoring suspect firms (those with a lar ger
failure probability) is not enough to prevent the
manipulation in firms with financial dif ficulties.
This result also suggests that bankruptcy predic-
tion models may not properly account for manage-
rial accounting choices. This is a potential
implication of our work that generates a research
question of interest: whether bankruptcy predic-
tion models could improve by explicitly consider-
ing accounting manipulation. Finally, the evidence
reported on the manipulation of real activities, al-
though admittedly limited due to data constraints,
is also of interest, as it raises the issue of sub-opti-
mal decision-making to conceal poor performance.
This may be of relevance to claimants and debt-
holders, as sub-optimal decision-making may re-
duce the liquidation value of some of the firm
assets prior to liquidation.
With respect to ex-post failed firms reporting
less conditionally conservative earnings in the
years preceding bankruptcy, this is a consequence
of both the manipulation of accounting accruals
relative to the current level of sales, and the ma-
nipulation of real activities to increase current
sales. We demonstrate that managers of ex-post
bankrupt firms attempt to delay bankruptcy by
recognising economic gains earlier and delaying
the recognition of economic losses. Given that
prior studies show that better governed firms pres-
ent more conditionally conservative accounting
numbers, our results may suggest that failed firms
have weaker governance structures that open the
door for the manipulation of real activities and to
increases in operational risk. However , this is an
issue that requires further research to obtain direct
evidence. The absence of conditionally conserva-
tive accounting practices worsens contracting effi-
ciency, increasing agency costs that af fect both
debt-holders (as managers avoid breaking debt
covenants), and shareholders (expropriated by
managers through compensation contracts that
would not have rewarded additional bonuses to
managers given the actual performance).
The evidence provided in the present study can
be, consequently, useful for regulators, to develop
and implement corporate governance provisions to
prevent managers’opportunistic behaviour; for au-
ditors, to understand better how managers exercise
the discretion inherent in accounting standards to
mask poor performance in financially troubled
firms; and to other parties (such as analysts, credi-
tors and researchers) who use accounting numbers
to assess failure probability , default risk and the
liquidation value of the firm.
136 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
18 These results are robust to the use of working capital dis-
cretionary accruals as the dependent variable in the model.
This is indicative of the use of aggressive accounting (pure ac-
counting manipulation).
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